Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

Enrique Gracia v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Janet C. Graham; Attorney general.
Richard P. Gale; Utah County Public Defenders .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gracia v. Utah, No. 981299 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1682

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RICHARD P. GALE USB 7054
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc,
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
245 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570

J%JLfi\J(*iLmtx

:

FU
;0

'fcizm-cA

DOCKET NO,

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Enrique Gracia
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

981299-CA

State of Utah
Appellee,

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

On Appeal from the Final Decree of
the Fourth District Court
Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Lynn W. Davis

Richard P. Gale Esq.
Utah County Public Defenders
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

Janet C. Graham
Attorney General
120 North 200 West #423
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JAN 0 7 1999
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, mayJulia
containD'AlesaiKfo
errors.

: Court

CHI

I R i f A C A DDETA s e>

RICHARD P. GALE USB 7054
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
245 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Enrique Gracia
Appellant,
vs,

Case No. 981299 -CA

State of Utah
Appellee,

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

On Appeal from the Final Decree of
the Fourth District Court
Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Lynn W. Davis

Richard P. Gale Esq.
Utah County Public Defenders
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

Janet C. Graham
Attorney General
120 North 200 West #423
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . . 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

5

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

5

C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

5

RELEVANT FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

17

ARGUMENT

19

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
ALLOWING HEARSAY INFORMATION CONCERNING LABORATORY
TEST RESULTS PERFORMED ON A URINE SPECIMEN TO BE
ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE

19

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
DEPRIVED GRACIA OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY
ADMITTING HEARSAY LABORATORY TEST RESULTS INTO
EVIDENCE

21

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
ALLOWING LABORATORY TEST RESULTS TO BE ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT HEARING EVIDENCE WHICH THE
COURT
COULD
CONSIDER
IN
DETERMINING
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CUSTODY OF THE
SPECIMEN AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF TAMPERING

24

II.

IV.

EVEN IF THE COURT HAD SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO
DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CUSTODY
OF THE SPECIMEN AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF TAMPERING,
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE
TEST RESULTS INTO EVIDENCE
iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TEST
RESULTS INTO EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL AND RESULTED
IN GRACIA'S CONVICTION

30

CONCLUSION

33

ADDENDUM

37

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

3, 21, 24

State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983)

2, 20

State v. Bradshaw. 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984)
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) . . .

25, 27
.3, 21, 22, 23, 24

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

4

State v. Eagle Book. Inc.. 583 P.2d 73 (Utah 1978)
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) .

25
. . . .29

State v. Madsen. 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670 (1972) . . . .

4, 25

State v. Oniskor. 29 Utah 2d 395 (1973)

22

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)

2

State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988) . . .12, 13, 25, 26
Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61 (Utah Ap. 1994) . 2

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (e)

1

Constitution of Utah Article 1 Section 12

15, 17

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

15, 17

Utah Rule of Evidence 802

19

v
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RICHARD P. GALE USB 7054
Utah County Public Defenders Assoc.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
245 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Appellee,

)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant, Enrique Gracia, appeals from a jury verdict which
found him guilty of one second degree felony charge and one class
A misdemeanor charge.

The trial was held in front of the

Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Judge, Fourth District Court, Utah
County, State of Utah.

The verdict of guilt was entered by the

court on March 13, 1998 and the defendant was sentenced on May
18, 1998 to a term of 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison to be
stayed upon his completion of 2 00 days in the Utah County Jail
and 3 6 months of probation.

The Appellant filed his notice of

appeal in a timely fashion.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Iggue I
Did the court commit error as a matter of law by allowing
hearsay evidence of laboratory test results to be admitted into
evidence without requiring a legal basis for the admission of the
hearsay information?

Standard of Review for Issue I
In general, trial courts are granted broad discretion in
admitting or excluding evidence.
(Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932

However, a decision on whether or not to admit

evidence is often the "Sum of several rulings each of which may
be reviewed under a separate standard. " State v. Thurman, 84 6
P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993).

In the case of business records, a

proper foundation must be laid by the proponent of the records.
If the trial court does not require that foundation be laid to
establish the necessary reliability, the court's decision is a
matter of law which should be reviewed for correctness.

See

State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), Trolley Square
Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Utah App. 1994) .

Issue II
Did the court err as a matter of law denying Gracia of his

2
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right to confrontation by allowing hearsay information concerning
laboratory test results to be admitted into evidence when the
court did not determine that the witnesses who tested the
specimen were unavailable and the court did not determine that
the information had a sufficient indicia of reliability?

Standard of Review for Issue II
When a defendant's right to confrontation is at issue a two
pronged test must be used by a court to determine whether prior
hearsay testimony should be admitted.

A failure by a court to

apply this test is a question of law which should be reviewed for
correctness.

See, State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), See

also, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

Issue III
Did the court commit error as a matter of law by allowing
laboratory test results performed on Gracia's urine specimen to
be admitted into evidence without requiring the state to present
adequate evidence for the court to consider the circumstances
surrounding the custody of the urine specimen and the likelihood
of tampering?

Standard of Review for Issue III
While abuse of discretion is the proper standard for
evidentiary rulings which require a balancing of factors,
individual legal determinations which are part of an overall
3
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evidentiary ruling are reviewed under the correction of error
standard.

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1222 n.2 (Utah 1993).

Issue iv
In the alternative to Issue III, did the court abuse its
discretion by allowing the State to introduce test results into
evidence when none of the six people who handled and tested the
urine specimen testified and the sole witness for the chain of
custody was the lab supervisor who did not handle or test the
specimen?

Standard of Review for Issue IV
If after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the
custody of an article and the likelihood of tampering these
factors the court is satisfied that the substance has not been
changed or altered it may permit its introduction into evidence.
Such decisions regarding the introduction of evidence will be
overtured only upon a showing that the court abused its
discretion.

State v. Madsen. 28 Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d

670, 672 (1972).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following Utah statutes are determinative in this
action:

4
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Utah Code Ann^§78-2a-3<e)
Constitution of Utah Article 1 Section 12
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Utah Rule of Evidence 802
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

On April 18, 1997, the State of Utah filed an information
alleging that the defendant, Enrique Gracia, Possessed or used
Cocaine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony and
unlawfully possessed drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a
class A misdemeanor.

B.

The matter proceeded to trial by jury.

Court of the Proceedings

A Jury Trial was held on March 11 and March 13, 1998 in the
Fourth District Court in front of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis.

C.

Disposition at Trial Court

The Jury returned a Verdict of guilty which was entered by
the court on March 13, 1998. The Defendant was sentenced by the
Court on May 18, 1998 to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison.
The Prison sentence was stayed upon Defendant's completion of 200
days in the Utah County Jail and 3 6 months probation.

RELEVANT FACTS
In the early hours of April 12, 1997, Officer Butterfield

5
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and Officer Mangleson of the Lehi Police Department received a
dispatch that there was a dispute or possibly a fight between
some roommates at 455 West Main Street in Lehi.

(R. 229-230)

Upon arriving at the scene they observed four males arguing
in a parking lot of an apartment complex, one of whom was later
identified as appellant, Enrique Gracia (Gracia). (R. 230-231)
At the scene Officer Butterfield noticed one of the
individuals, later identified as Russell Allen, push Mr. Gracia
and that another of the individuals, later identified as Scott
Allen, was carrying a baseball bat. (R.179, 232) He also noticed
a female individual, later identified as Russell and Scott
Allen's mother, Joanne Faust and another individual later
identified at Mark Harris. (R. 233)
The arguing individuals were standing at the head of a
flight of stairs which led to a basement apartment with its door
open.

After inspecting the scene Officer Butterfield decided to

separate the individuals in the hopes of calming them down.
Enrique then went in the apartment, followed by the rest of the
group and Officer Butterfield. (R. 233)
While in the apartment Officer Butterfield was informed by
Scott Allen and Mark Harris, that Gracia had attempted to flush
bindles of drugs down the toilet and that the toilet had
subsequently clogged and overflowed. (R.234-23 5)
Officer Butterfield then went into the bathroom and observed
some small balloon-like containers on the floor at which time he
called dispatch and had them page Detective Harold Terry to come
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and assist him.(R.235-236)
Following his page to Detective Terry, Gracia asked Officer
Butterfield to accompany him into his bedroom so that they could
talk privately about the incident.

Gracia indicated that there

was a lot of confusion and that he felt that the other
individuals were not allowing him to speak, therefore, he would
feel more comfortable speaking with the Officer in the privacy of
his own room. (R.23 6)
Officer Butterfield and Gracia entered Gracia's bedroom.
Officer Butterfield asked Gracia about the balloons and Gracia
indicated that he knew nothing about them.

While speaking with

Gracia, Officer Butterfield noticed what looked like a marijuana
pipe--a pop can with holes in it.

Officer Butterfield picked up

the can and observed residue. (R. 23 8) He asked Gracia if the can
was his and Gracia indicated that it was not. (R.250)
Detective Terry and Officer Gordon Smith arrived and met
with Officer Butterfield in the living room.

Officer Butterfield

described to Terry what he had seen in Gracia's bedroom and
showed him the bindles in the bathroom. The determination was
made to arrest Gracia. (R. 239, 260, 290)
Detective Terry spoke with Russell Allen, Scott Allen, Mark
Harris, Joann Faust, and Gracia.

Gracia explained that the drugs

were not his, and that someone else placed them in the bathroom.
(R. 279)

Gracia was arrested, transported to the police station.

(R. 267)
Gracia!s bedroom was searched and the officers found a pipe,
7
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butane and cigarette lighters, a hemostat, a box of baking soda,
plastic baggies with residue, a rolled up dollar bill, and a
spoon with residue on it.

They seized these items along with the

pop can that Officer Butterfield had seen earlier. (R. 239-243,
292-293)
Detective Terry took the balloons from the bathroom and the
items seized from the bedroom to the Lehi Police Department where
he logged it in, put it in a sack, and then placed it in a locked
bin for the evidence custodian, Sergeant James Munson. (R. 270271) Sergeant Munson then transported the evidence to the Utah
State Crime Lab and after it had been released, he transported it
back to Lehi. (R. 298)
While conducting his investigation detective Terry learned
that Gracia was on probation for Misdemeanor Theft (R.271, 282).
Terry called Adult Probation and Parole's twenty four hour line,
learned that John Perry was Mr. Gracia"s Probation Officer, and
asked Perry to come to the crime scene. (R 271-272)
Perry arrived at the scene and Detective Terry showed him
what he and Officer Butterfield had found. Perry authorized the
police to search Gracia's room pursuant to Gracia's probation
status.
Perry then went to where Gracia was being held and
collected a urine sample from Gracia. (R. Vol II 36-37)

After

collecting the urine sample, Perry transported the sample to
Adult Probation and Parole, where he sealed it, labeled it with
his name, Gracia's name, and the date and time the sample was
8
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collected, he then put the sample in a refrigerator located in
his office. (R. Vol II 38)
Later Perry removed the seal from the cup and poured a
sample into a container provided by Associated Regional and
University Pathologists "ARUP", a private laboratory in Salt Lake
City.

Perry took the sample to ARUP and requested that they test

the sample for cocaine.

Perry gave the sample to a technician at

the lab, where it was numbered, and initialed with Perry's
initials. (R Vol II 40-42)
On April 18, 1997 an Information was filed in the Fourth
Judicial District Court charging Enrique Gracia with Possessing
or Using Cocaine in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, and
Unlawfully Possessing Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a
Class A Misdemeanor.
A Preliminary Hearing was held in the Fourth Judicial
District Court before the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis on June
30, 1998.

The State did not call anyone from ARUP to testify at

the preliminary hearing.

The Court found that there was probable

cause and bound the case over for trial.
Trial was held on March 11 and 13, 1998.

On March 11, 1998

the State, called Scott Allen (R. 141) Allen Testified that he
had seen Gracia throw the cocaine into the toilet.

On cross

examination, Richard Gale, Gracia's attorney, asked Allen if he
had talked to Enrique Gracia following his arrest. Allen
indicated that he had not.

Mr. Gale asked Allen if he had ever

left threatening messages on Gracia's answering machine, Allen
9
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again indicated that he had not.

(R. 194) Mr. Gale read a

transcription of a message that was left on Gracia's answering
machine and asked Mr. Allen if he had left the message on
Gracia's answering machine.

Allen again denied leaving any

message and said that he had no reason to call him.

(R. 194,

196) Allen indicate that he was angry with Gracia on the day of
the incident but that he did not "plant" the drugs in an effort
to hurt Gracia. (R. 194-197)
The next day of trial, March 13, 1998, Mr. Gale called Scott
Allen to testify and asked him again if he had aver left messages
on Mr. Gracia's answering machine.

Scott indicated again, that

he did not. (R. Vol II 121).
Richard Gale then called Gracia to the stand.

He questioned

Gracia about how many times he had seen Scott Allen since the
incident.

Gracia indicated that it had been more than ten times.

Mr. Gale asked Gracia if he had ever received a answering machine
message from Scott Allen, Gracia indicated that on the 20th of
April, 1997 he had received a threatening message from Allen on
his answering machine.

Mr. Gale then played the tape of the

answering machine message. (R. Vol II 130)
Scott Allen was brought into the courtroom so that he could
listen to the tape.

Mr. Gracia indicated that he believed the

voice was of Scott Allen's. (R. Vol II 131)
Scott Allen was then called again to testify, he testified
that he had left the message but had forgotten about leaving it.
At the end of the first day of trial, after the jury had
10
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been dismissed, the Court went on record to discuss the
admissibility of Mr. Gracia's urine test. (R.3 02) The Court
stated that Defense Counsel had indicated to him that they would
not be calling Mr. Gracia as a witness, and that the Court
thought that the results of the blood test would probably be best
reserved for impeachment depending on what the defendant would
testify to. (R. 302)
The State argued that the jury had been told about the
balloons on the bathroom floor and how they got there and that
above and beyond the balloons sitting on the floor, that the
State had to prove how they got there.

The State argued that

they established a link with the balloons to the paraphernalia
found in the bedroom and that they wanted the jury to hear that
they had the "innermost connection that you can have," that
cocaine was found in Gracia's system. (R. 303) The State argued
further that if the Court was to accept the evidence, it would
certainly be specific evidence that would go to who possessed the
balloons. (R. 304)
The State indicated that they wanted to call a lab
technician from ARUP to testify about very scientifically
accepted tests, like the gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test
in order to admit the test results performed on

urine. (R. 3 04-

305)
Mr. Gale objected and stated that he thought there was
insufficient foundation for the laboratory test results to be
admitted into evidence.(R.3 05)
11
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The Court decided to call the individual from ARUP and argue
the established facts after he had testified. (R. 305)
The State called Gordon J. Nelson from the ARUP Laboratory.
Prior to asking any questions the state referred the court to the
case of State v. Wynia.
The State argued that pursuant to State v. Wynia the
circumstances surrounding the likelihood of tampering are likely
factors in determining evidence admitted and that if, after
consideration of these factors, the Court is satisfied that the
substance has not been changed or altered, that it may permit its
introduction into evidence.

He then stated that the ruling of

the Court would not be overturned, unless there was a showing of
an abuse of discretion. (R 307) The State then remarked that the
Appellate Court has said that once the evidence is in the hand's
of the State, that such evidence is generally presumed to be
handled with regularity, absent an affirmative showing of bad
faith or actual tampering. (R. 307)
Mr. Gale then indicated to the Court that he thought State
v. Wynia was very distinguishable from the case that was before
the Court at that time.

Mr. Gale stated that in Wynia the

Appellant was contesting the chain of custody because the
individual in the Crime Lab who actually opened the container and
tested the substance did not say that he had received the sample
from the individual who accepted it at the Crime Lab.(R. 3 08) Mr.
Gale then contended that the present case was completely
different, Gracia was objecting to the fact that Mr. Gordon
12
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Nelson was not the person who opened the substance, broke the
seal, or the one that tested the substance.
Mr. Gale then stated that prior to the proceedings, he had
spoken with Mr. Nelson in the presence of the state and that Mr.
Nelson informed him that there were three people who had handled
the specimen while it was at the laboratory. One person opened
the specimen, one person retrieved the specimen from the security
bag, and one person conducted a preliminary test on the sample.
Another person then conducted a confirmatory test. (R. 3 08)

Mr.

Gale then stated that none of the three individuals who handled
and tested the specimen where present in the courtroom.

(R. 3 08-

309)
Mr. Gale argued that Gracia could not explore the
circumstances surrounding the custody of the specimen or whether
the specimen had been tampered with because none of the three
individuals who had possession of the substance were there to
testify.

(R. 309)

Mr. Gale also argued that in Wynia, "they did testify that
the evidence was sealed.

Sealed, unopened envelopes with the

appropriate identifying marks strongly indicating that the
evidence was in its original form." (R. 310)
Mr. Gale also argued that in the present case there was no
one there to testify to the fact that they had themselves tested
the specimen. (R. 310)
The Court then decided to listen to the witness and
establish the facts after he had testified.

All parties agreed

13
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that Mr. Nelson was an expert and he was sworn in. (R.312)
Mr. Nelson testified about his education, work experience,
testing policies at the lab, the kinds of tests located at the
lab, and about the number of employees at the lab.

(R.312-315)

Mr. Gale interrupted the witness and indicated to the Court
that he did not dispute the validity of the tests, but instead
was concerned about the chain of custody with the sample. (R.315)
Mr. Nelson then testified more extensively about the testing
of samples and the equipment used to test such samples. (R. 316320)
Mr. Nelson also testified about records that are kept which
identify all individuals that handled the sample.

He testified

that according to his records, that an individual by the name of
Stacey Szareck had been the one that received the sample. (R.3 22)
Mr. Nelson then testified that 'Ms. Szareck was no longer working
at the lab and that she was not the one who tested the sample.
(R. 322-323)
Mr. Nelson explained about the chain of custody records kept
at the lab.

Mr. Nielsen testified that through his examination

of the chain of custody record he felt that the tests were done
appropriately. (R.326)
Following Mr. Nielsen's testimony, the court ruled that the
State had not yet met its burden in terms of foundation.

He

stated that Mr. Nelson was not acquainted with the individuals
who conducted the tests and whether or not their qualifications
met the Federal Guidelines.
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court then directed the State that it would be in their
best interest to have the individuals that handled the sample to
come in and testify.

He also stated that he would make a ruling

the next day. (R. 358-363)
On March 13, 1998, outside of the jury's presence, the judge
went on record to hear the argument's of the parties before he
made his ruling. (R. Vol II 5)
The state proffered to the Court that the following
individuals were involved with the sample: Stacy Szarek, who
received the sample from the probation officer, Stephanie Brown
accessed the sample, who released the sample to Maria Chacone,
who performed the initial test.

Next was Glenn Eldridge and Don

Nash, who deal with all positive result samples, then Teresa Lee,
and then lastly, Charles Jones, who runs the second test.

After

the second test it was then taken off the machine by Aiping Liu,
who then reviewed the data.(R. Vol II 6-9).
Mr. Gale argued that he objected to Mr. Nelson testifying,
because his testimony would be insufficient to establish chain of
custody for the urine sample.

He stated that the people who

broke the seal, who handled and open sample and conducted the
tests were not present to testify, and that the defense did not
have a chance to cross-examine. (R. Vol II 12-13)
Mr. Gale asserted that six people handled the opened sample,
and that none of them were there, and that by allowing Mr. Nelson
to testify, it violated Mr. Gracia's right to confrontation as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
15
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United States and Article I section 12 of the

Constitution of

the State of Utah. (R. Vol II 14)
He went on further to say that Mr. Gracia does not have the
opportunity to confront these witnesses, to cross-examine them,
or to find out why Ms. Szarek was released and whether it was for
tampering with the samples. (R. Vol II 14)
Finally, Mr. Gale argued that any information provided by
Mr. Nelson would be hearsay information read off of a piece of
paper. (R. Vol II 14)
The Court then ruled that Gordon Nelson would be allowed to
testify to the chain of custody and that the positive test
results performed on the urine sample would be admitted into
evidence. (R. Vol II 18)
Following the courts ruling the court heard testimony from
Gordon Nielsen, and John Perry, Gracia's probation officer.
After three hours of deliberation, the jury returned with a
guilty verdict and the Court set the matter for sentencing on
April 27, 1998.
On April 27, 1998 Gracia was sentenced to serve a term of
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, the execution of
the sentence was stayed, and Mr. Gracia was orderd to serve a
term of two hundred days in the Utah County Jail and to complete
3 6 months of supervised probation.

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Gracia contends that the trial court erred as a matter of
law in three areas or in the alternative abused its discretion.
These errors or abuse of discretion by the court resulted in
prejudicial error and Gracia's conviction.
First, Gracia contends the trial court erred by allowing
hearsay information regarding laboratory test results performed
on a urine specimen to be admitted into evidence.

The court

admitted the hearsay information when no exception to the hearsay
rule was presented by the State and the state did not present
adequate foundation for the court to allow admission of the
hearsay information.
Second, Gracia contends that in admitting into evidence
hearsay information regarding laboratory test results, the trial
court deprived Gracia of his right to confrontation as provided
by the Sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
and Article I section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. The trial
court committed this error by admitting the hearsay test results
into evidence without making the factual determinations necessary
to overcome Gracia's right to confrontation.

Before admitting

the hearsay information the court should have made a factual
determination that the six people who tested and handled the
urine specimen were unavailable and a factual determination that
the hearsay information bore a sufficient indicia of reliability.
Third, Gracia contends that the trial court erred as a
17
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matter of law in allowing the test results to be admitted into
evidence because the court did not have testimony through which
the court could determine the circumstances surrounding the
custody of the urine specimen and the likelihood of tampering.
The only evidence the court heard regarding the custody of the
specimen and the likelihood of tampering was inadmissable
hearsay.
Fourth, Gracia contends that even if the hearsay evidence
presented by the state was sufficient for the court to consider
the circumstances surrounding the custody of the urine specimen
and the likelihood of tampering, the court abused its discretion.
The court abused its discretion by allowing the hearsay test
results into evidence when the six people in the lab who handled
and tested the specimen did not testify.
Lastly, Gracia contends that such errors or abuses by the
court were prejudicial because the State relied on the hearsay
information so that they could argue to the jury that cocaine was
found in Gracia!s urine and therefore Gracia was guilty of
possessing other bindles of cocaine.

Other testimony and

evidence which connected Gracia to the bindles of cocaine was
shown by Gracia to be unreliable and biased.

Moreover, Gracia

had not planned on testifying in his own behalf and decided that
it would be necessary to testify following the court's admission
of the hearsay test results.

<
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY ALLOWING
HEARSAY INFORMATION CONCERNING LABORATORY TEST RESULTS
PERFORMED ON A URINE TO BE ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE

Gracia contends that the court erred by admitting hearsay
information regarding the laboratory test performed on a urine
specimen into evidence.

The court admitted the hearsay into

evidence without providing a legal basis for the admission.

No

exception to the hearsay rule was presented by the State nor was
adequate foundation presented to permit the court to allow
admission of the hearsay.
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 Provides: "Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." U.R.E.
802.
In the present case Gracia objected to the court admitting
the hearsay information concerning the laboratory test results
performed on a urine specimen. (R. Vol. 11,13, 19-25; 14, 1-21).
Notwithstanding Gracia's objection, the court admitted the
hearsay information into evidence.

The admitted the hearsay

without citing a provision of law or rule of evidence through
which the hearsay should be allowed.
19; 20, 1-20).

(R. Vol. II 17, 5-25; 18-

Furthermore, there is no exception to the hearsay

rule which was relevant or would have allowed the court to admit
the test results.
Presumably the state will argue that the hearsay information
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should have been allowed under one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule.

However, for evidence to be admissible under an

exception to the hearsay rule, foundation must be laid to
establish the necessary indicia of reliability.

State v. Bertul.

664 P.2d 1181.
In the present case no foundational findings were made by
the court.

At the close of the first day of trial the court

indicated that the state had not laid the proper foundation for
the hearsay information to be admitted into evidence and that the
state should attempt to subpoena the individuals that handled the
evidence in the laboratory so that they could testify on the
second day of trial.

(R. Vol I, 360, 7-25).

However, on the

second day of trial the court recieved a proffer of hearsay
information from the state.

The state used the proffer in an

effort to establish sufficent foundation for the court to allow
the hearsay laboratory results.

Following the profer by the

state.and over Gracia's objection, the court allowed the hearsay
information to be admitted into evidence and the labratory test
results to be presented to the jury.

The proffer of hearsay

information by the state did not provide any additional
foundation as to the reliability of the hearsay.

The proffer

simply provided the names and educational qualifications of the
individuals who handled and tested the specimen in the
laboratory.

(R. Vol. 11,6, 10-25, 8-23).

The information

provided by the state did not establish that the test results
were made in the regular course of business, when the hearsay was
20
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recorded or by whom, Whether the hearsay information was kept
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity, or any
other guarantees of trustworthiness.

Moreover, the court did not

make any findings necessary to establish the required foundation
for any exception to the hearsay rule.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEPRIVED
GRACIA OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY ADMITTING
HEARSAY LABORATORY TEST RESULTS INTO EVIDENCE

The trial court erred as amatter of law when it allowed
labratory test results to be admitted into evidence through
hearsay although there were six people who handled and tested the
urine specimen in the labratory.

Five of the six people's

wherabouts were known by the state but were not called upon to
testify.

Gracia never had an opportunity to cross examine any of

these six people on the circumstances surrounding the custody or
testing of the urine specimen.

Therefore, the court deprived

Gracia of his right to confrontation as provided by the Sixth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I
section 12 of the Constitution of Utah by admitting hearsay test
results into evidence.
In determining how prior testimony is to be weighed against
confrontation concerns, the United States Supreme Court outlined
a two-pronged test.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

This

two-pronged test was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the
case of State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).

21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Brooks,

the court indicated that for prior testimony to be admitted
through hearsay: first, "the witness must be unavailable" and
second, "the testimony must bear sufficient indicia of
reliability to permit its introduction at trial."

Id.r at 539.

Generally, a witness is unavailable for confrontaion purposes
when the state has made a good faith effort to obtain [the
witnesses] presence.

State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395 (1973).

In Brooks, the court allowed the prior testimony of two
transients who had testified at a preliminary hearing to be heard
at trial.

In making its decision, the Brooks court determined

that the two individuals could not be located by the state to
testify at trial and the prior testimony of the two individuals
at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient indicia of
reliability.

Id.. at 542.

In determining that the individuals in Brooks were not
available to testify, the court considered the fact that a police
officer had made a good faith effort to locate the witnesses.
Id., at 540.

The police officer testified that he had contacted

all known relatives, likely hangouts, the local bus terminals and
out of state police but could not locate the individuals.
In contrast to Brooks. the state in the present case knew
exactly where five of the six missing witnesses could be located.
(R. Vol. II, 10,3-25; 11, 1-15).

The witness who the state had

not located, Stacey Szarek, was no longer employed at the
laboratory.

However, the state presented no evidence that they
i
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had made any effort whatsoever to locate Stacey Szarek.

Indeed,

neither the state had not even attempted to obtain Stacey
Szarek's name until after the first day of trial.

Nevertheless,

even if the state had presented evidence sufficent for the court
to find that Stacey Szarek was unavailable to testify, the court
could not have concluded that the other five individuals were
constitutionally unavailable to testify.

In the proffer made by

the state, the court received information that the other five
individuals were at the laboratory on the day of trial and could
be called to testify.

The state indicated that requiring the

five individuals to testify would negatively impact the ability
of the laboratory to run effectively on that day. (R. Vol. II,
11, 12-19) . When considered in context with a defendant's right
to confrontaion, it seems that the loss of a person's liberty for
up to 15 years certainly outwieghs any inconvience the laboratory
may have experienced by losing the work product of five people
for a few hours.
In addition to the unavailability of the witnesses, the
Brooks court considered whether the witnesses prior testimony
bore a sufficient indicia of reliability.

The Brooks court

considered the fact that the prior statements of the witnesses
had been given at a preliminary hearing under oath. Id., at 540.
Moreover, the Brooks court considered the fact that at the
preliminary hearing the defendant had, " . . .a statutory right
to cross-examine the witness against him, and the right to
subpoena and present witnesses in his defense."

Id.
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Unlike the Byppkg case, in the present case, the six missing
witnesses did not testify to the test results while under oath at
a preliminary hearing.

The missing witnesses prior statements

simply consisted of writings on a sheet of paper.

Moreover,

Gracia, unlike Brooks did not have an opportunity to cross
examine the witnesses at a preliminary hearing.

In fact, the

actual names of the individuals who handled the urine specimen in
the laboratory were not provided to Gracia until the morning of
the second day of trial.

(R. Vol. II, 6, 10-25, 7-14).

In sum, the court did not make the legal determinations
required by Ohio v. Roberts, and State v. Brooks, to overcome a
defendants right to confrontation.

The court did not determine

that the six people who tested and handled the urine specimen
were unavailable testify.

Nor did the court determine that the

hearsay information bore the sufficient indicia of reliability.
Therefore the trial court deprived Graica of his right to
confrontation by allowing the laboratory test results to be
received by the jury through hearsay information.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY ALLOWING
LABORATORY TEST RESULTS TO BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE
WITHOUT HAVING EVIDENCE WHICH THE COURT COULD CONSIDER
IN DETERMINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
CUSTODY OF THE SPECIMEN AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF TAMPERING
Gracia contends that the trial court erred as a matter of
law by allowing the test results to be admitted into evidence
when the only evidence the court considered in determining the
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circumstances surrounding the custody of the urine specimen and
the likelihood of tampering was inadmissable hearsay.
Before a substance connected with the commission of a crime
is admissible as evidence, there must be a showing that the
proposed exhibit is what it purports to be and is in
substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the
crime. State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672
(1972).

The circumstances surrounding the custody of the article

and the likelihood of tampering are factors to be considered in
determining admissibility.

Id.

Nevertheless, a party proffering

evidence is not required to eliminate every conceivable
possibility that the evidence may have been altered.
Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Utah 1984).

State v.

Nor is every person

who handled a specific piece of evidence required to testify in
order for a party to establish a chain of custody.

State V,

Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988). Evidence is generally
presumed to have been handled with regularity once it is in the
hands of the state absent a showing of bad faith or actual
tampering.

State v,, Eagle Book, Inc., 583 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah

1978) .
Previously the courts have held that a court could make a
determination that a specimen was in substantially the same
condition as at the time the crime was committed even though
every person who handled the substance did not testify.
669.

Wynia at

However, in these previous cases persons who handled an

opened sample and actually performed the tests have always been
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present and have testified.

See, State v. Madsen. 28 Utah 108,

110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972); State v. Bradshaw. 680 P.2d
1036, 1040 (Utah 1984);

State V, Wynia. 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App.

1988) .
In Wynia this court held that sufficient facts had been
presented by the state for the court to make its determination
when the technician who actually received the sample into the
state crime lab did not testify. Wynia, at 669.

Unlike Wynia

however, in the present case, there were six people who actually
handled an opened urine specimen once it was received at the
laboratory. (R. Vol. II, 6-9) In Wynia, the person who checked
the unopened sample into the laboratory did not testify.
Nevertheless, the two people who actually handled the opened
sample and performed the test did testify.

Id., at 669. In

contrast to Wynia, in the present case six people handled an
opened sample and did not testify.

In particular, Stacey Szarek

and Stephanie Brown who received the specimen from the probation
officer, broke the seal and who poured off aliquots, did not
testify.

Unlike the missing link in Wynia, these two people

handled an opened sample.

Likewise, the two people who actually

performed the initial test, Maria Chacon and Glenn Eleridge, were
not called by the state to testify.

Additionally, the two people

who placed the specimen in the gas chromatograph mass
spectrometer, Charles Jones, and Aiping Liu, were not called by
the state to testify.

The only information the court recieved

upon which it could rely in determining the conditions
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surrounding the custody of the specimen and the liklihood of
tampering was hearsay testimony the court recieved from Gordon
Nielson, the laboratory supervisor.

Gordeon Nielson had no

personal knowledge of the specimen or the tests performend on the
specimen.

The only knowledge Gordon Nielson had was hearsay

information he read from a document.
Although the Utah Supreme Court held in State V. Bradshaw
that the state must not eliminate every concievable possibility
that a substance may have been altered, Bradshaw, is
distinguishable from the present case because the chemist who
actually tested the substance was called upon to testify.
Bradshaw, at 1040.

Unlike Bradshaw, in the present case the

state's only witness was Gordon Nielson, the lab supervisor who
never handled the specimen.

Bradshaw

is further distinguishable

from the present case because in Bradshaw the substance was in a
sealed envelope the entire time it was unattended. Id.. at 1039.
Unlike the sealed envelope in Bradshaw, the specimen in the
present case was opened and handled by six people who did not
testify.

Moreover, the sample in the present case was left

opened and unattended for a substantive period of time.

Gordon

Nielson testified that a shift change took place where Charles
Jones replaced Aiping Liu.

When this shift change occurred an

unopened aliquot of the specimen was on the gas chromatograph
machine. (R. Vol II 13, 21-25, 14, 1-10). The state did not
present any witnesses who could testify how long the sample was
unattended or who in the laboratory had access to the opened
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sample.

Hence, in the present case the specimen was opened and

unattended while the specimen in Bradshaw. was unattended but
remained in a sealed envelope.
Although, the courts of this state have allowed a link in
the chain of custody to be missing and a sealed sample to be left
unattended while in a locked mailbox, the court in the present
case has gone far beyond the prior case law and allowed test
results to be recieved into evidence when the person who tested
the specimen did not tesify.

The trial court's ruling in the

present case seems to surpass the outer limit that this state's
courts have allowed previously.
Because the state did not present any evidence except
hearsay, the court did not have sufficent information to
determine the circumstances surrounding the custody of the
specimen in this case or the liklihood of tampering.

Therefore,

the court erred as a matter of law in admitting the laboratory
test results performed on the urine specimen into evidence.

IV.

EVEN IF THE COURT HAD SUFFICENT INFORMATION TO
DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SUROUNDING THE CUSTODY OF
THE SPECIMEN AND THE LIKLIHOOD OF TAMPERING, THE COURT
ABUSED ITS DESCRETION BY ALLOWING THE TEST RESULTS INTO
EVIDENCE

Even if the hearsay evidence presented by the state was
sufficent for the court to consider the circumstances surrounding
the custody of the urine specimen and the liklihood of tampering,
the court abused its discretion by allowing the test results into
evidence when the six people in the lab who handled and tested
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

i

the specimen did not testify.
Generally, an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court's ruling was "beyond the limits of reasonability."

State

v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992).
In the present case the trial court's ruling was beyond the
limits of reasonability.

On the first day of trial the state

presented only one witness, Gordon Nielson, to testify concerning
the circustances surrounding the custody of the specimen and the
liklihood of tampering.

This witness wa a laboratory supervisor

who had never touched or tested the urine specimen. Upon Gracia1s
objection and based upon his inquiries the state indicated that
there were three people who had handled the specimen while it was
in the laboratory.

However, the state did not know the names of

these individuals, their qualifications, or any other information
regarding their behavior on the day the test was performed.
Following Gracia's objection, the court told the state that "it
would be in their best interest" to secure the presence of the
missing individuals in order to establish a chain of custody.
On the morning of the second day of trial the state provided
the names of six individuals who had handled and tested the urine
specimen in the laboratory.

This was the first time Gracia had

been provided with the names of the individuals who had handled
the specimen. (R. Vol. II, 6, 10-25, 7-14) . Additionally, this
was the first time Gracia had been told that six rather than
three individuals had handled the specimen.

The state proffered
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to the court that five of the six witnesses could be located at
the laboratory.

(R. Vol. II, 10,3-25; 11, 1-15).

The one

witness who the state had not located, Stacey Szarek, was no
longer employed at the laboratory.

However, the state had not

even attempted to procure Stacey Szarek1s name until after the
first day of trial.

Nevertheless, even if Stacey Szarek could

not be found, the court was unreasonable in admitting laboratory
test results through hearsay rather than requiring the five
individuals whose whereabouts were known to testify. The court
concluded that requiring the five individuals to testify would
negatively impact the ability of the laboratory to run
effectively on that day, therefore hearsay testimony from the
laboratory supervisor would be sufficent to establish a chain of
custody. (R. Vol. II, 11, 12-19).
Considering all the circumstances, it is readily apparant
that the court went beyond the limits of reasonability and abused
its discretion when it determined that the risk of
inconvienienceing a private laboratoy for a few hours outwieghed
the risk that an innocent person could lose his liberty for up to
15 years.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TEST RESULTS
INTO EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL AND RESULTED IN GRACIA'S
CONVICTION

Gracia contends that the court's error in admitting the
laboratory test results was prejudicial.

The state relied on the

fact that cocaine was found in the urine sample to link Gracia to
the bindles of cocaine which were found in the bathroom.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The

State in their closing argument admitted that the labaratory test
results were crucial to their case when they stated:
"[Gracia] would have you believe that somebody planted [the
drugs] there, but then there's the ultimate connection. And
that is after all of that evidence was found, a urine sample
was taken from the defendant, and it tested positive for
cocaine. In addition to all of the things that were in his
room, the cocaine was in him."
(R. Vol. II 204, 22-25; 205, 1-3)
Other testimony and evidence which was presented by the
State to show that Gracia possessed the bindles of cocaine was
shown by Gracia to be unreliable and biased.

Both of the

witnesses who told the police officers that they had seen Gracia
attempt to flush the drugs down the toilet were related to
Russell Allen. It was shown by Gracia that Russel Allen had made
threats against Gracia.

Additionally, Russell Allen had a motive

to frame Gracia because Gracia had threatened to report Russell
Allen to the Internal Revenue Service.

(R. Vol II 146-147).

And

Russell Allen would have been in danger of losing his business.
In fact, Rusell Allen had previously been convicted of disorderly
conduct for making threats against Gracia. (R. 159-161).

Part

of the court record in the disorderly conduct trial against
Russell Allen was a statement made by Allen that "the only thing
[Allen] wanted was to see [Gracia] go to prison for his cocaine
drug charges."

(R. 161, 12-24).

Allen also stated he would do

anything within his power to keep his trucks going.

(R. Vol. II

147, 8-19) .
Scott Allen, one of the two witnesses who said he saw Gracia
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throw the cocaine into the toilet was Russell Allen's younger
brother.

Scott Allen, lied on the stand about making threats

towards Gracia.

He adamantly denied making threats on three

different ocasions while under cross examination.

However,

after hearing his voice played to the jury on a cassette tape,
Scott Allen admitted he had called Gracia and made threats on his
answering machine.

(R. Vol II 131-133)

The other witness who said he saw Gracia attempt to flush
the cocaine down the toilet, Mark Harris, was a brother-in-law to
Russell Allen.

Moreover, Mark Harris did not have an opportunity

to observe Gracia when in the bathroom because Harris' view was
obstructed by both Scott Allen and Gracia.

(R. 224-230) .

Because the witnesses had a motive to lie and the
credibility of the witnesses was impeached, the fact that a urine
test indicating that Gracia had cocaine in his system was
extremely prejudicial to Gracia's case.
Gracia had not previously planned on testifying in his own
behalf and decided that it would be neccesary to testify so that
he could explain the test results following the court's decision
to admit the test results into evidence.

Furthermore, when the

court admitted the test results into evidence, the jury also
learned the prejudicial fact that Gracia was on probation for a
prior crime.
The fact that the laboratory test results were prejudical to
Gracia"s case is further demonstrated by the fact that the jury
deliberated for approximately three hours prior to convicting
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Gracia notwithstanding the fact that the test results were
admitted into evidence.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred as a matter of law by allowing hearsay
information regarding laboratory test results performed on a
urine specimen to be admitted into evidence.

In admitting such

hearsay information into evidence the trial court deprived Gracia
of his right to confrontation as provided by the Sixth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I section 12
of the Constitution of Utah.

The trial court also erred as a

matter of law in allowing the test results to be admitted into
evidence without determining the circumstances surrounding the
custody of the urine specimen and the likelihood of tampering.
If the hearsay evidence was sufficient for the court to consider
the circumstances surrounding the custody of the urine specimen
and the likelihood of tampering, the court abused its discretion.
The errors or abuses by the court were prejudicial because
the State relied on the hearsay information so that they could
argue to the jury that cocaine was found in Gracia's urine and
therefore Gracia was guilty of possessing other bindles of
cocaine when other testimony and evidence which connected Gracia
to the bindles of cocaine was shown by Gracia to be unreliable
and biased.
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WHEREFORE, defendant requests this court to reverse
appellant conviction and remand for a new trial.
DATED this

day of December, 1998

RICHARD P. Gal*
Attorney for Appellant

(
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ADDENDUM
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.^ijfe

JUDlSlAlJdODE

78-2-3

(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court, of record
holding a statute of. .the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United State&or the Utah Constitution;
(h) mterlbcutorjLappeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from thedistrict court involving a conviction
ofa first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, xhdgments, and" decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original'appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any* of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
:(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
:
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election* districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
•«-' through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying" a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
199678-2-3. R e p e a l e d .
78-2-4.

1986

S u p r e m e C o u r t — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s p r o tem-

pore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5. Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court ofAppeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
1986
78-2-7. Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.

1986,1988

482
"•'•'• CHAPTER 2a

m

COURT OE APPEALS
Section.,
78-2arL
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

^Creation — SeaL
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —'.*
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. •
~-U
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — SeaL
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seaL
.

1986

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court ofAppeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and. qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals*;
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge oF
the Court ofAppeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding-judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex- „
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
; (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
- 1
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-1
:
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formaT
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from .
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-^
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-^
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JUDICIAL CODE
d State Lands actions.reviewed by the executive direco£ the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
s, and Mining, and the state engineer;
3> appeals from the district court review of:
"v. (i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
©?
~(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
r63-46a-12.1; ..
^. ._.
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals^from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
'egree or capital felony;
v (e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
those involving a conviction of a first degree or
I felony;
*
v
;(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
3 sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
L
y other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
^challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
egree or capital'felony;
•' "••
appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordiwrits challenging the decisions of the Board of
anions
and Parole except in cases involving a first
_egree or capital felony;
f"- (h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela3 cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annult, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
doption, and paternity;
Hi} appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
*(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
- v
/the Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
for original appellate review and determination any
rover which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
liction.
The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require" ts of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
; in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1996
2a-4. R e v i e w of actions b y Supreme Court*
dew of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
ae Court.
1986
2a-5. Location of C o u r t of Appeals.
e Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
'^The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
location within the state.
1986

VS&4

Section. .^ .1^.l. . w _._...... : --, .-.c ...-,,..,•_. ni± ^ T
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
...... ; j^a;f^
78-3-17.5. . -Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-18.
... Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
78-3-19....
Purpose of act.
- .•
:*
^>T:>
78-3-20.
Definitions. : - .
'.
.?
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
~. ... Reports.
..-.•.;-_
~, ..-..•;•-*
78-3-21.5. - Databases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and
responsibilities.
78-3-25.
Assistants for administrator of the courts —
Appointment of trial court executives.
78-3-26.
Courts to provide information and statistical
data to administrator of the courts.
78-3-27.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-28.
Repealed.
78-3-29.
Presiding judge — Associate presiding judge—
Election—Term—Compensation—Powers
— Duties.
78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district court- ,
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule.
78-3-1 t o 78-3-2- Repealed.
1971, 1981,1968
78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y .
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified.
1968

78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — A p p e a l s .
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary
writs and other writs necessary to carry into eflfect their
orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with, the rules of the Supreme Court.
-ciiU
CHAPTER 3
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters
^ D I S T R I C T COURTS
properly filed i n the circuit court prior to July 1,1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudion"
"./•"
" '
' * • ' • .
cate trials de novo of the judgments of the justice court and o f
^ 1 to 78-3-2: Repealed.
the small claims department of the district court.
v;
•&. .
Term of judges — Vacancy.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of
Jurisdiction—Appeals:
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
Repealed.
(7) The district-court has jurisdiction to review agency
-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the
-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudi-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System.
cative proceedings.
.:••>..
-12.
Repealed.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has
3-12.5.,
Costs
of
system.
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Amend. I

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

!65t

AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT VIIL

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting; the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or ofthe press; or the right ofthe people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances:

[Bail—Punishment.]
.
..
.-^
Excessive bail shall not be required", nor excessive- ones
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 'j£2'

AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right ofthe people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT m
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent ofthe Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENTIV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right ofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENTS

- • ^?nfc

...*,

;. * , ; . ~ : ^

[Rights retained by people.]
'•••'..~X
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights", shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI

?

[Suits against states — Restriction ofjudicial power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT XII

[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
AMENDMENT V
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro- Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
cess of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise Vice-President, and ofthe number of votes for each, which lists
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, the Government of the United States, directed to the Presior in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same presence ofthe Senate and House of Representatives, open all
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, person having the greatest number of votes for President,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
without just compensation.
numbers not* exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediAMENDMENT VI
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President,
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
[Rights of accused.]
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the consist of a member or members from two-thirds ofthe states,
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit- And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
law, and to be informed of the nature, and cause of the them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 'Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case ofthe
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.in his favor, death or other constitutional disability of the President—The
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
person having, the greatest number of votes as Vice-President,
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority ofthe
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
AMENDMENT VH
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise necessary to a choice.J3ut no person constitutionally ineligible
to the office of President shall be ehgibleto that of Vicere-examinedDigitized
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Art I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd as.)
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury i n civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress o f injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by t h e
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad. vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided.by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part a t any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant i f appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994

660

S e c 14. [Unreasonable searches' forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,, houses, - I
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 1
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon j
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly * |
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
r
be seized
189*.
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the1 right
to determine the law and the fact..
1896
S e c 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
S e c 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
S e c 18. [Attainder — E x post facto laws — Impairing;
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation-of contracts shall be passed.
1896
S e c 19. [Treason defined — Proof:]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
S e c 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
S e c 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been, duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
S e c 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896
S e c 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
r a
privilege or immunity.
'
-;
1896
- \" :\j :'.' • : - - . . - .;•*

JI

S e c 24. [Uniform: operation: of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation*

•• '•'.' 1896
Sec. 13. [Prosecution b y information o r i n d i c t m e n t —
Grand jury.]
S e c 25. [Rights retained by people.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictThis enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination or deny others retained by the people.
1896
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by S e c 26. [Provisions mandatory a n d prohibitory.];
indictment, with
or without
such examination
and
committhis Constitution are mandatory and
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Rule 801

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be
called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be
subject to aross-examination by each: party, including a party
calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the court
may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds
which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil
actions and proceedings involving just compesation under the
Fifth Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the
compesation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion
and at such time as the court direct, and thereafter charged in
like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact
that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule
limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own
selection.

82

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant T _
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter?:
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling:
event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
,T
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind;
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
.;"
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat- J
ment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general .
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
-,
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge
but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
ARTICLE V m . HEARSAY
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If
Rule 801. Definitions.
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless
The following definitions apply under this article:
offered by an adverse party.
(a) Statement. A "statement^ is (1) an oral or written asser(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum,
tion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
statement.
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay* is a statement, other than one made
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custo(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not dian or other qualified witness, unless the source of informahearsay if:
tion or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning paragraph includes business, institution, association, profesthe statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the conducted for profit.
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declar(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the
ant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied provisions of paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compiinfluence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person lations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of
made after perceiving the person; or
Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered the matter; if the matter was of a kind of which a memoranagainst a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either dum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made
an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement and preserved, unless the sources of information or other
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, stateto make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a state- ments, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
ment by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, 1
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by Daw as to* |
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, 1
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other j
of the conspiracy.
law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed- J
ings and against the Government in criminaT cases, factual 1
findings resulting^ from an investigation made pursuant to ^
Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or j
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
i
these rules.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, A
in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the *
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to require- 3
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